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Abstract Extortion racketeering is a crime that blights the lives of everyone in
societies where it takes hold. Whilst most European countries have some form of
extortion racketeering, in most countries it is isolated to some ethnic communities. In
Southern Italy and Sicily, extortion racketeering is still a feature of overall society. This
paper attempts to look at the phenomenon from the angle of collectives, of resistance
building through civic organisations such as Addiopizzo. For this investigation a
computational model is presented to analyse the effect of team-reasoning on levels of
resistance in systemic extortion rackets. An agent-based model is presented that
implements the interaction of different kinds of decision-making of extortion victims
with law enforcement deterrence. The results show that established extortion rackets are
hard to undermine unless bottom-up civic engagement and law enforcement go hand in
hand.
Keywords Agent-basedmodelling . Extortion rackets . Social change
Introduction
Extortion is the demand for money (or favours) using the threat of violence. An
extortion racket is the continuous, regular and systematic extortion of several victims
by a criminal or (more usually) a criminal organisation. Extortion racketeering is a
global phenomenon. In a report on the extortion phenomenon in EU member states, a
detailed country-by-country comparison is given of levels of extortion, what kinds of
extortions are prevalent, who are the perpetrators and who are the victims (Transcrime
(2008)). Almost all EU member states have some kind of extortion but in most it is at
low levels and largely confined either to particular ethnic groups or to the criminal
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underworld. There are however some places where extortion is endemic. One of theses
places is southern Italy and Sicily where the Mafia organisations Cosa Nostra,
’Ndrangheta, Camorra and Sacra Corona Unita have an extortive stronghold on
several industrial sectors, such as the building trade and waste management. They also
have a stronghold on territories where entrepreneurs, e.g. shop, restaurant or bar
owners, are systematically extorted for protection money, called the pizzo. In most
Latin American countries, drug cartels and gangs extort rural areas and the urban poor
by the collection of protection money as well as rich people through extortive kidnap-
ping. In Japan the Yakuza is represented in all walks of life up to the highest echelons of
society, executing extortive practices to gain influence. In Russia and former Soviet
countries the Russian Mafia maintains a stronghold over many industries. Worldwide
motorcycle gangs, such as the Hell’s Angels and Bandidos, run protection rackets. For
a typology and international comparison of extortion rackets, see Anzola and
Elsenbroich (2015).
This paper starts from a recent development in Sicily, spreading throughout other
areas of Italy affected by extortion rackets: the advent and rise of Addiopizzo.
Addiopizzo is a civic movement originating in 2004 with seven students and since then
having developed into one of the most important bottom-up resistance groups against
the Mafia. Their initial campaign was to plaster the city of Palermo with stickers
stating: BA society who pays the pizzo is a society without dignity .^ Since then
Addiopizzo has recruited increasing numbers of entrepreneurs, from small shops and
restaurants to large cooperations, with a current membership of 1000 entrepreneurs and
12,000 consumers taking an anti-pizzo stance.1 Members pledge to no longer pay the
pizzo and have their finances thoroughly investigated to verify the pledge.
BTo get this certification, firms have to undergo a fairly lengthy review process
managed by a committee comprised of university professors, entrepreneurs, and
members of other anti-racket organizations.^ (Vaccaro 2012, p. 28).
Once they pass, entrepreneurs become members and get a sticker they can display
on their shop to show their anti-Mafia stance and to inform consumers that they are a
pizzo-free shop. Addiopizzo also offers advise and help to entrepreneurs, supports
denunciation of mafia activity, including participating in anti-mafia trials and runs
programs educating about the Mafia (e.g. in schools). Despite the continuing success
of Addiopizzo, around 80 % of businesses still pay pizzo, constituting an important
revenue stream for the Mafia.
The beginnings of the Mafia are unknown but Gambetta (2000) points to a first
mention of the Mafia in 1838 as an already established social force (Hess 1986, p. 114).
Since then the Mafia reigned with impunity until this century; only now the bastion of
power is slowly crumbling due to societal rejection of the Mafia, changes in legislature
and increased law enforcement.
In this article we focus on two specific civic changes and two law enforcement
interventions supporting the demise of the Mafia. Whilst for most crimes, crime
reduction can focus on the criminals, e.g. by increasing deterrence or situational
prevention, in the case of extortion the focus needs to also be on the victims, due to
the parasitic and semi-collusive nature of extortion. One traditional way to do this was
to punish collusion with extorters, trying to deter victims from paying protection
1 Cf. http://www.addiopizzo.org/english.asp [accessed 11/05/2016]
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money. For example in Italy, before 1992 entrepreneurs paying extortion money were
often fined for collusion. The policy of deterrence was rather unsuccessful, partly
because people feared the Mafia more than the Italian state. Since1992 the state has
shifted away from deterring entrepreneurs towards supporting them to denounce
extortion and resist extortion payment, by offering protection, relocation and even
financial compensation (La Spina (2008)).
We present an agent-based model to test two kinds of decision-making of entrepre-
neurs regarding the payment of protection money. We investigate how the decline of
the Mafia might come about by analysing the effect of behaviour changes and law
enforcement interventions on levels of resistance. The paper is structured as follows:
Section 2 discusses relevant literature on extortion rackets. Section 3 introduces the
method of agent-based modelling and how it has so far been applied to the modelling of
extortion rackets. In Section 4 an agent-based model of extortion racketeering is
presented that implements different decision functions for entrepreneurs to pay the
pizzo or resist. In Section 5 the model results are presented. The paper concludes in
Section 6.
Extortion racketeering
Extortion is a widespread phenomenon and one of the defining features of Mafia Type
Organisations. Extortion is one manifestation of a variety of predatory crimes (Best
1982, p.108). It defies a classical categorisation in criminology, into crimes against the
person and crimes against property as the transaction is monetary (property) but the
threat can be either property or person.
In a quali-quantitative analysis of extortion cases in Sicily, the types of intimidation
found were intimidation against property (39 %), against people (33 %), against people
and property (6 %) and the remaining 22 % had either no intimidation or intimidation
was not detectable. Comparing warning to actual damage, in the case of people 77 %
were warnings and 23 % resulted in actual damage, in the case of property warning
accounts for only 37 with 63 % resulting in actual damage, most likely arson (68 %); cf.
Militello et al. (2014).
Another unique aspect of extortion is the openness in which it is pursued. Although
extortion is clandestine in the sense that only the extorter and its victim know about it,
the victim is fully aware of its situation and able to make decisions regarding the
extortion outcome. These decisions are to pay up, to refuse payment or to negotiate a
reduction in price, although only about 12 % of cases analysed in Militello et al. (2014)
had any form of negotiation.
Despite its ubiquity extortion is a difficult crime to research. Given that the
perpetrators are notoriously difficult to come by, much of the early research
focussed on victims with survey research such as CENSIS (2003), SOS Impresa
(2007), Euripsped (2007). Whilst trying to measure the quantitative aspects of
extortion racketeering in Italy, these surveys did not enhance the understanding of
extortion rackets. Similarly, qualitative interviews with victims are insufficient to
produce anything at the level of generality that would help to understand either the
problem or the extent of extortion. The main problem of victimisation research in
this area is that levels of underreporting will be very high due to factors such as fear
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of Mafia retribution, of prosecution by officials for collusion or of shame for
colluding.
Accurate statistics are not available and there is good reason to believe that even
where data are available, levels of underreporting are potentially high affecting the
viability of the datasets. Alternative empirical analyses can be found in La Spina (2008)
and Transcrime (2013). They use multiple data-sources, including judicial documents,
police reports etc. The research focus is shifted from the quantity of extortion to the
understanding of the dynamics of extortion. This focus can also be found in the game
theoretic models discussed below.
Transcrime (2008) provides a European wide comparison of extortion
racketeering practices. EU memberstates are evaluated according to levels of extor-
tion, the nature of the perpetrators and their victims. Types of extortion are distin-
guished according to whether the extortion is casual or systemic, and whether it is
parasitic, symbiotic or predatory. Whilst the categories of casual and systemic focus
on the actions of the perpetrators, parasitic, symbiotic and predatory shift the focus
on the relationship between perpetrator and victim. However, in general predatory
extortion goes hand in hand with casual extortion and symbiotic and parasitic
extortion with systemic extortion. The reason is simple, if the perpetrator’s interest
is short term and casual the extortion demand can be the maximum amount, even if
this might destroy the victim. If the perpetrator’s interest is long term, looking for a
systemic racket, there is an interest to keep the victim healthy, leading to parasitic or
even symbiotic extortion.
This distinction leads to three types of victim behaviours, acquiescent, complicit and
resistant (La Spina (2008)). Acquiescents are those silently paying the pizzo without
reaping benefit, complicits pay but also benefit from the relationship with the extorter,
e.g. by the extorter eradicating the competition or protecting the complicit from other
Mafia organisations. These two victim behaviours result in parasitic and symbiotic
extortion respectively. Resistants are extortion victims who decide not to pay. Militello
et al. (2014) found the frequency of these behaviours to be roughly 60 % acquiescent,
27 % resistant and 6 % complicit; 7 % of cases could not be classified. One interesting
result from Transcrime (2008) is that in most European countries, parasitic and
systemic extortion are largely perpetrated within ethnic minority communities, terrorist
organisations and the criminal underworld. The biggest exception is Italy (mainly
Southern Italy and Sicily) where extortion is systemic and practiced on the whole
population by long standing Mafia organisations. One explanation has been a very high
level of distrust, towards the authorities as well as fellow citizens. Gambetta (2000)
describes how the history of invasion created a culture of distrust and how this is the
main stumbling block in fighting the Mafia. Gambetta (1993) provides an analysis of
how the Mafia becomes a guarantor in market exchanges, ensuring the quality of goods
and limiting fraudulent interactions. The Mafia becomes a regulating authority, replac-
ing personal trust. But it is not only this personal trust that is lacking in Italy but also
Bsystemic trust^, the trust that relies on the existence of laws and law enforcement.
When the state is too weak to protect its citizens the Mafia fills the power void. Paoli
(2001) identifies the unpopularity of the Italian State since unification in 1861 as one of
the major causes in the difficulty of penetrating the rule of the Mafia.
Paoli (2001) points to a change in the social estimation of the Mafia, resulting from
the judicial campaigns against Mafia and corruption. Since the 1990s the Mafia lost
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public support, partly due to the violent murders of the anti-Mafia Judges Falcone and
Borsellino. Since the new Millennium the Mafia has become under increasing pressure
by law enforcement and the judiciary as well as from civic society through organisa-
tions such as Addiopizzo which are evidence of a growing anti-Mafia sentiment in
society.
But it is not only a lack of personal or institutional trust that is seen as an
explanation for the emergence or persistence of extortion rackets. Extortion rackets
have also been approached from an economic perspective. On a macroeconomic
level one might look at the role extortion racketeering plays in an economy, either by
analysing how the Mafia regulates markets (see above) (Gambetta (1993)) or
following an analysis of underground and over-ground markets and their interde-
pendencies in Schelling (1967). Schelling distinguishes between Black Markets and
racketeering, providing a typology of organised crime endeavours. He discusses
policy influences, such as prohibition, and analyses organisational structures of
organised crime. He suggests that extortion rackets are simply a means to an
economic end and contributes to a conceptual embedding of extortion dynamics
into simple market dynamics.
A further economic aspect of racketeering is to analyse how the economic situation
influences the success of racketeering. In particular unemployment and poverty have
been linked to Mafia success as they provide a pool of recruits which cannot find legal
employment (Lotspeich (1995)). In general, underdeveloped economies have been
linked to Mafia infiltration although Calderoni (2011) points out that the Mafia is far
from restricted to the economically underdeveloped regions of the South of Italy. Sung
(2004) compares the economic failure hypothesis to the weak state hypothesis. State
failure and economic failure were shown to be essential features of states infested by
organised crime. In particular corruption of the judiciary and a thriving underground
economy promoted organised crime whilst unemployment levels alone did not have a
significant influence.
The micro level transactions in an extortion racket can also be viewed
through economic spectacles, i.e. employing economic theory for the analysis
(cf. Gambetta (1988, 1994); Varese (1994, 2001); Smith and Varese (2001)).
This means to employ game theory for the analysis of the interdependent
decisions of various players. The main focus has been the interaction between
one extorter and one victim, i.e. a two-player-game (Smith and Varese (2001))
but there is also some work on the interaction between police and extorters
(Konrad and Skaperdas (1998)). The decision focus is very intuitive as the
extortion situations read almost immediately as a game theoretic decision tree,
in particular in the case of the extorter/entrepreneur interaction. The extorter
demands protection money from an entrepreneur, the entrepreneur decides to
pay or not to pay depending on its expectation of being punished for resistance.
If the payment demand is smaller than the probability of punishment multiplied
by the possible damage, the entrepreneur will pay the extorter. Usually protec-
tion demands are small and, whilst a lot of punishments are symbolic or rather
minor, potentially punishments are very high (e.g. arson attacks, murder). This
means the important variable to assess for the entrepreneur is how likely it is to
get punished by an extorter.
This game theoretic conceptualisation is the theoretical starting point of our ABM.
Trends Organ Crim
Agent-based modelling
Agent-based modelling (ABM hereafter) is a relatively new methodology in the social
sciences. It has successfully been used in disparate fields such as criminology, geog-
raphy, organisation research, economics and sociology (cf. Squazzoni (2010), Liu and
Eck (2008), Heppenstall et al. (2012), Watts and Gilbert (2014), Janssen and Ostrom
(2006), Elsenbroich and Gilbert (2014)).
An ABM is a computer program that creates a world of autonomous, heteroge-
neous software objects, called agents, in which each agent interacts with other agents
and with the environment (Gilbert (2008)). For an agent to be autonomous means that
its decisions are not made by a central decision maker (i.e. a programmer) but that the
agent makes decisions depending on its own situation, goals, abilities, etc. Agents can
be heterogeneous in their attributes, their situations, their roles and their behaviours.
ABM is a particularly useful methodology for understanding social influence and
neighbourhood effects, the interactions and interdependencies between different dy-
namics and dynamic developments of a system.
In Criminology ABM has been used for theory testing (Groff (2007); Johnson and
Groff (2014), Birks et al. (2014)) and theory development (Birks et al. (2012)). The
focus has been on theories such as rational choice, routine activity theory and
environmental/situational approaches. A particularly interesting development for crim-
inology is the integration of ABM and GIS which allows more detailed investigation of
spatial patterns and crime dispersion (Liu and Eck 2008, Chapter 11).
There are some ABM exploring dynamics related to extortion, such as van Baal
(2004, 2008) investigating tax fraud in such a way that agents decide on paying or not
paying tax by evaluating punishments of neighbouring agents. Stewart and Plotkin
(2012, 2013) discuss extortion in a slightly different definition where extortion is the
exploitation of winning strategies in a Prisoner’s Dilemma.
More directly related ABM are presented in Troitzsch (2015), which discusses a
model of extortion racketeering embedded in society to explore distribution effects.
It is a systems perspective model in which individual decision-making is not taken
into account. Interactions between the agent-sets of shops, consumers, extorters
and police are investigated over a variety of input parameters, such as punishment-
severity, denunciation-propensity and prosecution propensity (see also Troitzsch
(2016) in this volume). Sonzogni et al. (2011) presents a model of Camorra
operating in a specific region of Italy. The model investigates the effect of punish-
ment severity and risk on compliance and collusion effects in different socio-
economic and demographic environments. Nardin et al. (2016a) presents a model
investigating the consequences to extortion rackets of changes to social norms. The
model represents entrepreneurs as influenced by normative communication from
the state and other entrepreneurs, based on the cognitive normative agent architec-
ture Emil-A (Andrighetto et al. (2010)). Elsenbroich and Badham (2016) provides
an ABM inspired by the game theoretic analysis of extortion rackets discussed in
Smith and Varese (2001). This model shows the importance of implementing social
aspects of extortion by comparing a decision-mechanism based only on an entre-
preneur’s memory with a decision mechanism that takes into account what is
happening in the neighbourhood of an entrepreneur.
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In the next section an ABM of extortion racketeering is presented that explores the
effects of different kinds of entrepreneur decision-making that might contribute to the
erosion of established extortion rackets. The model in this paper contributes to the
literature of agent-based models of extortion racketeering by implementing team
reasoning, a reasoning mode which takes group membership and group payoffs into
account. Team reasoning is a collective extension to individualistic rational reasoning,
modelled in Elsenbroich and Badham (2016) and an alternative to normative reasoning
modelled in and Nardin et al. (2016b), locating the motivation for behaviour change not
in the recognition of a social norm but in the membership of a group.
The model
The model presented in this paper is an abstract ABM. The decision rules are
extrapolated from theoretical models like game theory and the numerical inputs, such
as the levels of pizzo, damages, income, cost etc. are implemented with some propor-
tionality rather than being informed by real data. Hence this model is far from a model
calibrated and validated against data, able to produce policy advise on fighting the
Mafia. What it does though is to systematically explore the effects of small changes in
the decision function on overall levels of acquiescence and resistance. The decision
function itself is informed by the intuition that entrepreneurs weigh up the danger and
severity of being punished against the payment of pizzo, and although the actual values
for punishment and pizzo are rather arbitrary, the decision function mirrors reality in
that the potential cost of being punished is much higher than the pizzo, operationalising
the fear factor Mafia type organisations exude.
The purpose of the model is to assist the understanding of the influences of
normative and collective considerations together with law enforcement deterrence on
levels of acquiescence in extortion racket systems. The model is implemented in
NetLogo 5.0.1 (Wilensky (1999)) and is an extension of a basic model assessing the
influence of neighbourhood effects on levels of resistance (Elsenbroich and Badham
(2016)). This basic model demonstrates that extortion rackets can only become em-
bedded in society if potential victims are able to observe (or otherwise learn about)
implemented punishments. Whilst this model examined the emergence and persistence
of extortion rackets, the model in this paper tries to understand their decline. For this it
looks at the efficacy and interplay of two bottom-up decision mechanisms and two top-
down law enforcement interventions. The bottom-up mechanisms are linked to the
influence that civic organisations, such as Addiopizzo, might have on entrepreneur
decision-making.
1. Bottom-Up Mechanisms
& Social Norms: Arguably in Mafia ruled areas of Italy, paying the pizzo is a
social norm. Observing other entrepreneurs resisting the pizzo changes this
perceived norm, enabling behaviour change. Civic organisations such as
Addiopizzo might help to emphasise normative considerations. In the model
this is implemented as normative reasoning by dividing the punishment
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probability by the number of resistants an entrepreneur observes in its
neighbourhood.2
& Collectives: Addiopizzo is a membership organisation and might produce the
feeling of belonging to a group. Group membership can have a profound
influence on a person’s decision-making, e.g. engendering trust in cooperation
(Sugden (1993)). In the case of an extortion racket, the difference might be to
change from an individual perception of the situation to a collective perception.
In the model this is implemented as collective reasoning by multiplying the
cost of paying the pizzo by the size of the group an agent feels part of.3
2. Top-down Mechanisms
& Increasing Cost: If the Mafia can reign with impunity, unmolested by law
enforcement, punishing resistant extorters is easy. However, if law enforce-
ment hinders Mafia operations, punishment becomes dangerous, making
extorters often unable to punish. In the model this is operationalised as a
high cost of punishment. The cost is deducted from a Mafioso’s wealth after
each punishment; if a Mafioso’s wealth is lower than this cost, it is unable to
punish.
& Mafia Under Surveillance: Rather than making it difficult for the Mafia to
punish, individual Mafiosi are taken out by surveillance so that they can no
longer punish. In the model this is implemented by allowing some extorters to
extort but not to punish. This is a reinterpretation of the idea of Fakers from
Smith and Varese (2001) which is implemented in Elsenbroich and Badham
(2016).
The model consists of a 61 × 61 torus-world of patches. There are two kinds of
agents in the model, extorters and entrepreneurs. The model is initialised with 1000
entrepreneurs, randomly distributed on the world and 10 extorters, located in a circle
with radius 15. The non-random allocation of extorters was chosen to reduce random
effects resulting from clustering of extorters. Extorters approach entrepreneurs with a
request for money, the pizzo. Once an entrepreneur agrees to pay, it pays this sum on a
monthly basis. Each month (30 ticks) entrepreneurs assess the situation anew to decide
whether to pay or refuse.
The decision to pay or not is made by weighing up the likelihood of punishment
and the resulting damage against the cost of the pizzo. Entrepreneurs estimate the
2 The definition of normative reasoning used in this paper is rather specific and one reviewer pointed out that
what is implemented is really just another version of instrumental reasoning. The existence of genuine
normative reasoning is an unresolved debate. Much of normative reasoning in ABM has been implemented
as a Bsocially informed rationality ,^ for example as norms establishing by following the agent’s strategy with
the highest payoff (e.g. Axelrod (1986)). In this model I followed the idea of normativity being socially
informed rationality, to not introduce another “innovation” into this ABM. Innovative approaches to normative
reasoning in ABM can be found in Troitzsch (2016) and Nardin et. al (2016) in this volume who based the
modelling on the EMIL architecture, the most genuinely normative implementation in ABM (Andrighetto
et al. (2010)).
3 Note that all payoffs are equally important to the collectively reasoning entrepreneur. Although this might
seem counterintuitive it follows the definition of team reasoning in Gold and Sugden (2006) and Sugden
(2003).
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probability of punishment by observing punishments in their neighbourhood. If an
agent observes a punishment its subjective probability is increased to 1, being
divided by 1.1 each step no punishment is observed. The severity of punishment
is set at 1,000,000 monetary units; this is deliberately a high value expressing the
fear of Mafia punishment rather than the actual cost of real world Mafia punish-
ments, which are often intimidation rather than actual damage (Militello et al.
(2014)). The pizzo is set at 100 units, which is a realistic estimate if at the lower
end of the actual demand.
The model is used to understand the influence of the four kinds of reasoning on the
levels of acquiescence and the number of punishments. Tables 1 and 2 show the
parameters of the simulation, what kinds of values they represent and for Table 2
which range of values they take in the experimentation.
One tick in the simulation represents one day; payday occurring every 30 ticks. Both
entrepreneurs and extorters get paid on payday and entrepreneurs make the decision
whether to pay their extorter or resist. On payday entrepreneurs obtain 400 monetary
units in profits, so the pizzo is one quarter of the profit. Note that in this model neither
the income nor the cumulative wealth of entrepreneurs plays a role in the decision
function. In this paper the only purpose of entrepreneur payment is to transfer money to
the extorter on a regular basis, dependent on the number of entrepreneurs on the payroll
of the extorter. Once the extorter runs out of money they can no longer punish.4 Given
the relative irrelevance of entrepreneur profits in this set of experiments they are kept
homogenously at 400 monetary units.
Every day an extorter can make an extortion demand to one entrepreneur. If the
entrepreneur is not yet extorted it decides whether to pay or not; if it decides to pay a
payment link is established between the extorter and the entrepreneur, if it decides to
resist a resistant link is established. If it is already extorted, nothing happens. Each step
an extorter can punish one random entrepreneur linked by a resistant link. An extorter
only punishes if it has enough money (wealth ≥ cost of punishment). After punishment
the extorter’s wealth is updated as is the wealth of the punished entrepreneur.
Entrepreneurs who are punished just live with debt in the current model.5
In the normative extension, agents observe levels of resistance in their
neighbourhood and as resistance increases their subjective probability of punishment
decreases, interpreting resistance as a new social norm. This is different from
implementations of normative reasoning which is purely imitation or rule focused
(e.g. Epstein (2000)). It is, however, in line with models where agents imitate agents
with maximal payoffs (e.g. Axelrod (1997)). In our model entrepreneurs always
consider the cost and benefit of acquiescence and resistance, rather than simply
following others. The reason for this is that the punishments by the Mafia are
potentially devastating, taking away the lively-hood of an entrepreneur or causing
physical harm, making simple imitation or rule following unrealistic.
The collective extension is based on a collective extension of game theory
developed by Bacharach and Sugden called team-reasoning (Bacharach (1999),
4 This transaction is nonetheless implemented in the model using a regular payday for entrepreneurs so that the
model can be used in future work to measure for example differences in equity between individualist and
collectivist entrepreneurs.
5 The effects of individual entrepreneur’s wealth will be explored in future work to investigate different
strategies of parasitic extortion.
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Gold and Sugden (2006) Sugden (2003)). The idea is that although individuals
maximise utility, they sometimes opt for maximising a group’s utility rather than
their own. In the model this means evaluating not only the individual pizzo payment
but the group pizzo.
The baseline reasoning for the model is the individualist strategic mode adopted
from the model discussed in Elsenbroich and Badham (2016). Each agent i assesses the
punishment probability Pi from its neighbourhood, multiplies it by the potential damage
caused by a punishment and compares this to the pizzo that will have to be paid
(Eq. (1)).
Individualist strategic
If Pi  D≥Epay;
refuse otherwise
ð1Þ
Normative reasoning amends the left hand side of the equation by dividing the
punishment probability by the number of resistants observed in the neighbourhood
(Eq. (2)). Both the punishment probability and the resistance levels are observed within
a given neighbourhood radius.
Table 2 Parameters used as variables in the experiments
Experimental-variables Range Exp-values Meaning
neighbourhood-radius 1–30 5 10 15 20 25 30 Range of other agents considered
extorter-radius 1–30 5 10 15 20 25 30 Range of extorter territory
normative True/False True/False Entrepreneurs reasoning normatively
num-collectivists 1–1000 1000 Number of collectivist entrepreneurs
group-radius 1–30 5 10 15 20 25 30 Size of collective
num-fakers 0–10 0 3 5 7 Mafiosi that cannot punish
cost 1–10,000 1 500 10,000 Criminal justice pressure on Mafia
The three horizontal groupings represent experimental parameters from the basic model, top-down interven-
tions and bottom up change
Table 1 Parameters in the model that are held constant throughout experimentation
Fixed parameters Value Meaning
profit 400 Money paid to entrepreneurs every 30 ticks
pizzo 100 Value of protection payment
damages 1,000,000 Cost of being punished by Mafia
num-extorters 10 Number of Mafiosi
num-entrepreneurs 1000 Number of entrepreneurs
punishment-prob 0.5 Entrepreneur’s initial perception of punishment
prob-reduction 0.1 Increment punishment probability decreases
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Individualist normative
If Pi=Ri  D≥ Epay;
refuse otherwise
ð2Þ
Collective reasoning amends the right hand side of the equation by multiplying the
pizzo by the number of agents in the group (Eq. (3)). The cost is now not just the
individual’s but the cost of paying the pizzo is calculated for the whole group. Note that
although the equations for normative and collective reasoning look mathematically
equivalent, they are different as Gi is a fixed value throughout the simulation whilst Ri
varies depending on the levels of resistance.
Collectivist strategic
If Pi  D≥Gi  Epay;
refuse otherwise
ð3Þ
To combine normative and collective reasoning both sides of the equation are
amended (Eq. (4)).
Collectivist normative
If Pi=Ri  D≥ Gi  Epay;
refuse otherwise
ð4Þ
Equations (1)–(4) are summarised in Table 3, the matrix style representation is
inspired by work on context dependent decision-making in ABM (Elsenbroich
and Verhagen (2015)). Each reasoning represented here is dependent on environ-
mental factors; the neighbourhood radius determines the punishment probability Pi
by representing the neighbourhood in which punishment is observed. For norma-
tive reasoning the neighbourhood radius also represents the area in which resis-
tance is observed to extrapolate a social norm. For collective reasoning the group
radius determines the size Gi of the group the entrepreneur i considers in the
calculation. The average number of agents in the set for varying radii is mapped
in Table 4.
Table 3 The matrix of decision functions, where Pi is the probability of punishment for entrepreneur i, D the
potential damage caused, E the pizzo, Ri the number of resistants observed by i and Gi the size of the group
agent i feels a member of
Individualist Collective
Strategic Pi × D < E Pi × D <Gi × E
Normative Pi /Ri × D < E Pi /Ri × D <Gi × E
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Two things need to be noted in this implementation of team reasoning:
a) the payoff of all group members is considered equally;
b) the group sizes experimented on is large.
The reason for the uniform consideration of group member payoffs is that there are
currently no criteria tomake a distinction. Such criteria would either result from different
agents being more or less deserving/important or from relationships between agents, e.g.
relationships of trust, friendship, and neither are modelled here. The relatively large
group size is a result of a sweep of the parameter space. Smaller group sizes do not show
any change in behaviour of the model, hence they are not reported here. We recognise
that the large group size might be controversial, in particular for theories of team-
reasoning relying on intergroup trust bonds (cf. Sugden (2003)). Trust bonds diminish
rapidly with increasing group size (cf. Soboroff (2012)). We do nonetheless think this
implementation is adequate as we are investigating an institutionalised group resulting
from Addiopizzo membership rather than informal allegiances.
Elsenbroich and Badham (2016) showed the importance of the ability to punish
sufficiently for the Mafia to keep control over their extortion territory. Although they do
not have to punish a lot, if resistance is not punished sufficiently, resistance gets out of
hand and the extortion racket falls apart. Normative and collective reasoning have been
implemented to explore changes to levels of acquiescence brought about by entrepre-
neurs interpreting their contexts differently. Two law enforcement mechanisms that
undermine the Mafia’s ability to punish are implemented. The first one is to increase the
cost of a punishment. As discussed above, the cost should not be read as a simple
monetary cost. Punishing a resistant extorter means a Mafioso exposes itself to possible
capture by the police. The cost of punishment should be interpreted as an overall
pressure exerted by the law enforcement agencies. The second way the police could
undermine punishment is to put some Mafiosi under surveillance so they can no longer
punish. This is implemented by making a number of the extorters unable to punish.
Results
The results focus on the levels of acquiescence to pay the pizzo over a range of
reasoning and law enforcement contexts. The model was initialised with an extortion
racket in place, i.e. those in the territory of an extorter were paying pizzo. In the
experiments the model ran for 1000 steps, with five runs over each parameter combi-
nation.6 The analysis was done over the dataset recording the simulation output for each
6 Within parameter variation was found to be low in test runs, deeming five runs sufficient for robustness
Table 4 The average number of agents in a neighbourhood or group for the sampled radii
Radius 5 10 15 20 25 30
# of agents 20 75 180 325 515 755
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step of the simulation. The data was curtailed to contain steps 300-1000 to eliminate
remaining run in effects.
The baseline context is the individualist strategic context from Elsenbroich and
Badham (2016). In this context acquiescence is consistently high, paired with low
levels of punishment. The first amended context is an implementation of individualist
normative reasoning (see Section 4 for a description). Figure 1 shows that individualist
normative reasoning has very little impact on either acquiescence or levels of
punishment.
This is a fairly surprising result as one would expect a rise in resistance for large
neighbourhood radii. The reason behind it is that extorters keep such good control over
their territory that levels of resistance never get to a critical point to influence the
entrepreneurs normatively at a large enough scale.
Figure 2 shows levels of acquiescence and punishment for collective strategic
and collective normative contexts over a variety of group radii, columns 1–3
showing strategic, column 4–6 showing normative reasoning. For collectivist stra-
tegic contexts a slight increase in resistance can be observed for high group radii
(≥25) and high extorter radii (≥ 25) (see row one, columns 5 and 6). The reason
behind this is that in larger territories the Mafia starts losing control. This is a result
from the model only allowing the Mafia to punish one entrepreneur per time step; if
in a large extortion territory several agents start to resist, one punishment per time
step might not be enough to rein them all in again. Thus the punishment probability
is lower for some agents in the extended territory which, combined with the high
pizzo cost resulting from the large group, leads to increasing resistance. The effects,
however, are small.
For collectivist normative contexts the impact for increasing group radii is
significant. Figure 2 row three, column three shows that for a group radius of 15,
acquiescence breaks down for large extorter radii, in particular for lower
neighbourhood radii. This effect is strong, leading to almost complete resistance
at group sizes of 30 (row three, column six), except for very small extorter and
neighbourhood radii. In the strategic case the reason for very low levels of punish-
ment in the combination of large extorter radii and small neighbourhood radii is that
the population is acquiescent (see row two). In the normative case the pattern of
punishments looks similar, but as here it is paired with high resistance, the cause of
the low levels of punishment is different: Mafiosi have run out of resources to
punish, rather than it not being necessary to punish (see row four, columns four, five
and six). Whilst normative reasoning made very little difference in the individualist
Fig. 1 Acquiescence and average punishments per extorter per step for individualist strategic and normative
reasoning
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case, in the collectivist case it brings about a runaway effect of resistance, leading to
the Mafia running out of money.
Given that the Mafia looses control of extortion rackets due to running out of
resources, it is worth investigating the role of the cost of punishment in bringing the
Mafia down. The collectivist normative case showed the possibility of an extortion
racket being brought down by them running out of resources at a static cost level of
500. In the following experiment the cost is evaluated for values 1, 500 and 10,000; the
group radius is kept constant at 15 (which was the first group radius which showed
changes).
Figure 3 shows that for individualist strategic and normative settings the
increase in cost for punishment leads to almost no reduction in acquiescence
except for very small extorter radii. If the extorter territory is too small an extorter
does not have enough potential victims to regain the money needed for the next
punishment. In higher extorter radii the effect of high acquiescence resulting from
very low levels of punishment is emphasised. In the collectivist strategic case
resistance can be achieved for an extorter radius of 10, even at high cost, but
otherwise the same pattern of extremely low punishment and complete acquies-
cence can be observed.
In the collectivist normative case, a reduction of cost of punishment leads to
higher levels of acquiescence. However, for large extorter radii acquiescence is very
low, despite the high levels of punishment. For the case where punishment is
Fig. 2 Acquiescence and average punishments per extorter per step. The rows show acquiescence and
punishments for collectivist strategic and collectivist normative reasoning respectively. The columns show
varying group radii between 5 and 30, increasing in increments of 5
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restricted by a cost of 10,000, full resistance is reached and the Mafia can no longer
punish.
As discussed in Section 4 the second law enforcement intervention to be explored is
putting some Mafiosi under surveillance, i.e. allowing those extorters to extort but not
to punish.
Figure 4 shows similar patterns of levels of acquiescence, only reducing in the
collective normative case. However some interesting facts need to be noted. One
is the reduced acquiescence at low extorter radii. The lower the number of
punishing Mafiosi, the more likely it becomes that there is a loss of control.
Keeping control of one’s territory as a Mafioso under surveillance is to rely on
your victims being deterred by other extorters. If the territories do not
(sufficiently) overlap it is impossible for Mafiosi that cannot punish to live in
the shadow of others (see also the analysis of Fakers in Elsenbroich and Badham
(2016)).
For the collectivist normative case putting some Mafiosi under surveillance has
very strong effects. Even taking three Mafiosi out leads to significant reduction of
acquiescence, in particular for higher extorter radii where even punishing Mafiosi
can loose control. For increasing neighbourhood radii the effect is surprising as one
would expect acquiescence to increase with neighbourhood size but this only
happens for very high radii.
Fig. 3 Acquiescence and average punishments per extorter per step. Row one shows levels of acquiescence,
row two levels of punishment for individualist strategic and individualist normative reasoning. Row three
shows levels of acquiescence, row two levels of punishment for collectivist strategic and collectivist normative
reasoning. The columns differentiate levels of cost sat at 1, 500 and 10,000. Columns 1–3 represent strategic
reasoning, columns 4–6 normative reasoning. The group radius is held constant at 15
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Conclusion & future work
This paper presented an agent-based model for the systematic exploration the
undermining of established Mafia’s extortion racketeering. The underlying question
is about civic (bottom-up) and law enforcement (top-down) ways of undermining
extortion rackets. The model presented is an extension of an agent-based model
investigating neighbourhood effects of deterrence on levels of acquiescence
(Elsenbroich and Badham (2016)), finding that socially transmitted deterrence is
essential to the flourishing of extortion rackets. In Elsenbroich and Badham (2016)
entrepreneurs take information about punishments of neighbouring entrepreneurs
into account when deciding to pay the pizzo or not. In the model discussed here
entrepreneurs use information about punishments but also take resistance
of neighbouring entrepreneurs and team members into account when making a
decision. Whilst socially transmitted deterrence is essential for the flourishing of
extortion rackets, this model shows the impact socially transmitted resistance can
have on extortion rackets.
Socially transmitted resistance is implemented via two additional kinds of reasoning
that might impact on levels of resistance in a population. The first reasoning is for
entrepreneurs to reason normatively. Normative reasoning amends the utility function
by reducing the punishment probability according to the number of agents in the
Fig. 4 Acquiescence and average punishments per extorter per step. Row one shows levels of acquiescence,
row two levels of punishment for individualist strategic and individualist normative reasoning. Row three
shows levels of acquiescence, row four levels of punishment for collectivist strategic and collectivist
normative reasoning. The columns differentiate 0, 3, 5, 7 Mafiosi under surveillance. Columns 1–3 represent
strategic reasoning, columns 4–6 normative reasoning. The group radius is held constant at 15
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neighbourhood that resist a racket. Collective reasoning amends the utility function by
increasing the pizzo that is weighed up against the punishment to the pizzo of the whole
group.
The results show that neither of the amendments on their own lead to significant
changes, except for very high group radii. In general this poses a problem for
collective reasoning aspects as often collective reasoning relies on trust and trust
diminishes with increasing group size. In the case of extortion rackets the collective
is not an informal groups but with organised resistance, in the form of e.g.
Addiopizzo, meaning trust might be maintained with increasing group size. The
more interesting result is how the combination of normative and collective reason-
ing brings about significant changes to resistance levels. These changes start occur-
ring from medium group sizes (180 agents).
The reasoning amendments were implemented across two law enforcement inter-
ventions (in line with the original model). The first one, to increase the cost of
punishment, has surprisingly little effect on extortion rackets, even though the cost
constrains punishments. The computations show how few punishments might be
sufficient to maintain an extortion racket. The second one is to take out a number of
Mafiosi by surveillance, meaning they can still extort but no longer punish. The
intervention shows results for individualist strategic and normative and collectivist
strategic only for very low extorter radii (i.e. not very established extortion rackets).
In established extortion rackets those that cannot punish can live in the shadow of
Mafiosi still able to punish. In the collective normative case, hindering some Mafiosi
from punishing has major effects. Taking out 30 % of Mafiosi is sufficient to reduce
acquiescence significantly. The reason is that those Mafiosi still able to punish have
insufficient ability to punish large waves of resistance.
There are, as always, limitations to this research. Models, by definition, are repre-
sentations of reality and these representations can be at differing levels of abstraction.
The model discussed in this article is an abstract model investigating a particular
interdependency of neighbourhood effects, resistance and deterrence of Mafiosi.
Models at this level of abstraction are often derided as Btoy models^, bearing no
relationship to the real world. Although abstract models are not calibrated against or
validated by real world data, they are nonetheless useful as a tool to investigate
dynamics and interdependencies that exist in the real world. Abstract models allow
for the systematic exploration of a limited set of interdependencies and dynamics by
limiting the parameter space. Whilst having limited empirical validation, abstract
models reduce opacity. The model in this paper fixed a set of parameters, e.g. pizzo,
punishment, to simplify the exploration of the relevant dynamics. This loss of realism
resulting from the isolation of the reasoning mechanisms was a conscious decision to
increase the transparency of the model.
In future work we are looking to use the findings of the possible importance of
groups and team-reasoning and integrate them in data driven models of extortion
racketeering, such as Troitzsch and Nardin et al (in this volume). ABM has so far
focussed on individualistic approaches to social interaction and the model presented
here is one of the first implementations of collective reasoning into an ABM (cf.
Elsenbroich and Verhagen (2015)) and this model has shown that team reasoning is
a potentially important aspect when analysing real world phenomena such as
extortion rackets.
Trends Organ Crim
Acknowledgments I would like to thank Jennifer Badham for her help with the analysis of the model as
well as two anonymous referees that helped me to improve the paper even futher. All remaining mistakes are
mine. The research presented here is undertaken within the project Collective Reasoning as a Moral Point of
View (AH/L007282/1) funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council, UK.
Compliance with ethical standards
Ethical approval This article does not contain any studies with animals or human participants performed by
any of the authors.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and repro-
duction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a
link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
References
Andrighetto G, Campenni M, Conte R (2010) Making the theory explicit: the EMIL-A architecture. In:
EMergence In the Loop: simulating the two way dynamics of norm innovation, chap 9, p 77–88
Anzola D, Elsenbroich C (2015) A typology of extortion racket systems. Deliverable 1.3, Global Dynamics of
Extortion Racket Systems
Axelrod R (1986) An evolutionary approach to norms. Am Polit Sci Rev 80:1095–1111
Axelrod R (1997) The complexity of cooperation: agent-based models of competition and collaboration.
Princeton University Press
BacharachM (1999) Interactive team reasoning: a contribution to the theory of cooperation. Res Econ 53:117–147
Best J (1982) Crime as strategic interaction: the social organization of extortion. J Contemp Ethnogr 11:107–128
Birks D, Townsley M, Stewart A (2012) Generative explanations of crime: using simulation to test crimino-
logical theory. Criminology 50(1):221–254
Birks D, Townsley M, Stewart A (2014) Emergent patterns of interpersonal victimisation: an agent-based
approach. J Res Crime Delinq
Calderoni F (2011) Where is the mafia in Italy? measuring the presence of the mafia across Italian provinces.
Global Crime 12(1)
Elsenbroich C, Badham J (2016) The extortion relationship: a computational analysis. J Artif Soc Soc Simul 19(4):8
Elsenbroich C, Gilbert N (2014) Modelling norms. Springer
Elsenbroich C, Verhagen H (2015) The simplicity of complex agents a contextual action framework for
computational agents. Mind & Society
Epstein J (2000) Learning to be thoughtless: social norms and individual computing. Tech. rep., Center on
Social and Economic Dynamics Working Paper, No. 6
Gambetta D (1988) Fragments of an economic theory of the mafia. Eur J Sociol 29(1):127–145
Gambetta D (1993) The Sicilian Mafia. Harvard University Press
Gambetta D (1994) Inscrutable markets. Ration Soc 6:353–368
Gambetta D (2000) Mafia: the price of distrust. Tech. rep., Department of Sociology, University of Oxford,
http://www.sociology.ox.ac.uk/papers/gambetta158-175.pdf
Gilbert N (2008) Agent-basedmodels. no. 153 in quantitative applications in the social sciences. Sage Publications
Gold N, Sugden R (eds) (2006) Michael Bacharach: beyond individual choice: teams and frames in game
theory. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Groff ER (2007) Simulation for theory testing and experimentation: an example using routine activity theory
and street robbery. J Quant Criminol 23:75–103
Heppenstall AJ, Crooks A, See LM, BattyM (eds) (2012) Agent-based models of geographical systems. Springer
Hess H (1986) The traditional sicilian mafia: organized crime and repressive crime. In: Kelly RJ (ed)
Organized crime: a global perspective. Rowman and Littlefield, Totowa
Janssen M, Ostrom E (2006) Empirically based, agent-based models. Ecol Soc 11(2)
Johnson SD, Groff ER (2014) Strengthening theoretical testing in criminology using agent-based modeling. J
Res Crime Delinq
Konrad KA, Skaperdas S (1998) Extortion. Economica 65(260):461–477
Trends Organ Crim
La Spina A (2008) Recent anti-mafia strategies: the Italian experience. In: Siegel D, Nelen H (eds) Organised
crime: culture, markets and policies. Springer, Dortrecht
Liu L, Eck J (eds) (2008) Artificial crime analysis systems: using computer simulations and geographic
information systems. Idea Group Publishing, Hershey
Lotspeich R (1995) Crime in the transition economies. Eur-Asia Stud 47(5)
Militello V, Spina AL, Frazzica G, Punzo V, Scaglione A (2014) Quali-quantitative summary of data on
extortion rackets in sicily. Deliverable, GLODERS
Nardin LG, Andrighetto G, Conte R, Székely Á , Anzola D, Elsenbroich C, Lotzmann U, NeumannM, Punzo
V, Troitzsch KG (2016a) Simulating protection rackets: a case study of the Sicilian mafia. J Auton Agent
Multi-Agent Syst:1–31
Nardin G, Szekely A, Andrighetto G (2016b) GLODERS-S: a simulator for agent-based models of criminal
organisations. Trends Org Crime. doi:10.1007/s12117-016-9287-y
Paoli L (2001) Crime, Italian style. Deadalus 130(3):157–185
Schelling T (1967) Economics and criminal enterprise. Public Interest 7
Smith A, Varese F (2001) Payment, protection and punishment: the role of information and reputation in the
Mafia. Ration Soc 13:349–393
Soboroff, SD (2012) Group size and the trust, cohesion, and commitment of group members. PhD (Doctor of
Philosophy) thesis, University of Iowa, 2012
Sonzogni B, Cecconi F, Conte R (2011) On the interplay between extortion and punishment. an agent based
model of camorra. In: Computational Social Science Society of America Annual Conference (CSSSA
2011), Santa Fe, New Mexico
Squazzoni F (2010) The impact of agent-based models in the social sciences after 15 years of incursions. Hist
Econ Ideas XVIII(2)
Stewart AJ, Plotkin JB (2012) Extortion and cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A
109(26):10,134–10,135
Stewart AJ, Plotkin JB (2013) From extortion to generosity, evolution in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. Proc
Natl Acad Sci U S A 110(38):15,348–15,353
Sugden R (1993) Thinking as a team: towards an explanation of non-selfish behaviour. Soc Philos Policy
10(1):69–89
Sugden R (2003) The logic of team reasoning. Philos Explor 6:165–181
Sung HE (2004) State failure, economic failure and predatory organized crime: a comparative analysis. J Res
Crime Delinq
Transcrime (2008) Study on extortion racketeering the need for an instrument to combat activities Study on
Extortion Racketeering: the need for an instrument to combat activities of organised crime. Transcrime
Working Paper, Joint Research Centre on Transnational Crime
Transcrime (2013) Progetto pon sicurezza 2007–2013 gli investimenti delle mafie. Tech. rep., Joint Reserach
Centre on Transnational Crime Universita Cattolica del Sacro Cuore di Milano
Troitzsch KG (2015) Distribution effects of extortion racket systems. In: Ambard F, Miguel FJ, Blanchet A,
Gaudou B (eds) Advances in artificial economics, LNEMS vol. 676. Springer, p 181–193
Troitzsch K (2016) Can agent-based simulation models replicate organised crime?. Trends in Organized
Crime, this volume
Vaccaro A (2012) To pay or not to pay? dynamic transparency and the fight against the mafia’s extortionists. J
Bus Ethics 106
van Baal P (2004) Computer simulations of criminal deterrence. The Federation Press
van Baal P D2008] Realistic spatial backcloth is not that important in agent based simulation. In: Liu L, Eck J
Deds] Artificial crime analysis systems: using computer simulations and geographic information systems.
Idea Group Publishing, Hershey,
chap 2
Varese F (1994) Is Sicily the future of Russia? private protection and the rise of the Russian mafia. Eur J Sociol
35:224–258
Varese F (2001) The russian mafia: private protection in a new market economy. Open University Press
Watts C, Gilbert N (2014) Models of genuine novelty. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham
Wilensky U (1999) NetLogo. Center for connected learning and computer-based modeling, Northwestern
University. Evanston, IL., http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/
Trends Organ Crim
